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Data as of Q3 2026
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Total shares institutions bought (green) vs sold (red) each quarter across all holders.
Inferred from quarter-over-quarter change in each fund's 13F position (new stakes count as buys, exits as sells). Not tick-level trades.
Last reported position per insider, carried forward. Steps can be a holding disclosed for the first time rather than a trade.
| Date | Insider | What it was | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | Icahn Carl C Director | Otherindirect | 40,531,194 | $7.01 | $284.2m |
| 2026-08-14 | Papapostolou Ted President and CEO | Grant | 33,242 | $0.00 | — |
| 2026-08-14 | 5 co-filers Chief Financial Officer | Grant | 6,648 | $0.00 | — |
| 2026-06-25 | Icahn Carl C Director | Otherindirect | 36,456,030 | $7.30 | $266.0m |
| 2026-05-06 | 5 co-filers Chief Financial Officer | Option exercise99d late | 20,486 | — | — |
| 2026-05-06 | 5 co-filers Chief Financial Officer | Other99d late | 20,486 | $7.88 | $161k |
| 2026-05-06 | 5 co-filers Chief Financial Officer | Option exercise99d late | 20,486 | $0.00 | — |
| 2026-05-06 | 5 co-filers Chief Financial Officer | Other99d late | 22,610 | $0.00 | — |
| 2026-04-15 | Icahn Carl C Director | Otherindirect | 32,536,774 | $7.67 | $249.7m |
| 2025-12-24 | Icahn Carl C Director | Otherindirect | 30,467,595 | $7.70 | $234.5m |
Every row is classified by what it MEANT, not by its SEC code. A code is not a meaning: code P (“purchase”) also covers dividend reinvestment and employee stock purchase plans, and code S (“sale”) also covers 10b5-1 plan sales scheduled months earlier and option exercises sold the same day.
Across 30 days of all filings, $5.08bn of insider selling contained $3.50bn of plan sales and $0.46bn of exercise-and-sell. Only 29% was discretionary. Reading an unclassified feed badly overstates how much insiders decided.
Buys and sales are counted separately and never netted. They are different decisions by different people; a company where one officer bought while another sold is not “neutral”.
The holding line carries each insider's last reported position forward, so it shows the total held rather than a sawtooth of whoever traded that day. It covers only insiders who filed in the window.
“Filed late” counts calendar days past the two-business-day deadline with five days' grace, so a Thursday or Friday trade crossing a weekend is never flagged. It describes the company's filing discipline, not the trade.
Insider activity is descriptive. Nothing here is investment advice.
Total return (dividends reinvested) vs the market, from quarter-end prices.
Above 0 = ahead of the S&P 500 since the window start; below 0 = behind. Rising means it's pulling ahead.
How far the stock fell below its prior peak. Deeper, longer drawdowns = a rougher ride to the same return.
Quarter-end, dividend-adjusted (total return). Beta & volatility from quarterly returns (annualized). Benchmark is the S&P 500 (SPY total return). Annual returns compound the quarters ending in each calendar year; the first and last years in a window may be partial. Past performance doesn't predict future results.
Ranked against 10 sector peers with collected financials. Valuation from latest close × latest fiscal-year fundamentals; 13F conviction as of 2026-09-30.
Percentile is “goodness” within the peer set (100 = best). For valuation and leverage that means cheaper / less-levered ranks higher.
| Company | Mkt cap ▼ | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/S | Rev gr | Gross | Net | ROE | ROIC | Net D/EBITDA | 13F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XOM | $770.0B | 27.9× | — | 2.3× | -5.0% | — | 8.7% | 11.1% | 9.5% | — | 87 |
| CVX | $462.0B | 35.5× | — | 2.4× | -6.8% | 42.8% | 6.5% | 6.6% | 6.6% | — | 1,638 |
| COP | $187.7B | 24.3× | — | 3.2× | 7.7% | 62.1% | 13.6% | 12.4% | 12.2% | — | 893 |
| MPC | $124.9B | 33.6× | 13.3× | 0.9× | -4.4% | 10.0% | 3.0% | 23.4% | 8.1% | 2.5× | 765 |
| VLO | $111.5B | 52.8× | 21.2× | 0.9× | -5.5% | 4.4% | 1.9% | 9.9% | 7.1% | 0.8× | 752 |
| PSX | $110.3B | 26.2× | 33.5× | 0.8× | -7.5% | 12.3% | 3.3% | 15.1% | 9.0% | 4.8× | 860 |
| PBF | $9.2B | — | 34.3× | 0.3× | -11.4% | -1.9% | -0.5% | -3.0% | -2.1% | 5.1× | 112 |
| CVI | $5.9B | 216.2× | 12.1× | 0.8× | -5.9% | 4.8% | 0.4% | 3.7% | 1.1% | 2.1× | 46 |
| DK | $4.5B | — | 10.2× | 0.4× | -9.5% | 5.7% | -0.2% | -4.2% | -0.6% | 3.7× | 67 |
| CLMT | $4.4B | — | 25.1× | 1.1× | -1.2% | 5.9% | -0.8% | 4.6% | -2.3% | 8.2× | 35 |
| IEP | $3.7B | — | — | 0.4× | -3.6% | — | -3.1% | — | — | — | 36 |
Peers = companies sharing IEP's sector (Petroleum Refining) with collected SEC financials. Multiples use the most recent end-of-day close and latest fiscal-year fundamentals (trailing, not forward). Missing cells mean the peer never reported that line item, has no collected price, or has a non-positive denominator. Not investment advice.
Top 40 institutional holders — bubble size is position value, color is the move since last quarter. Hover any holder for detail.
Drag any bubble to rearrange · size = dollar value of the position
Solve the discounted cash flow backwards, then stress-test the assumptions.
Average free cash flow across the last 2 positive fiscal years (FY2023, FY2024). Smooths the cycle. Stock compensation is NOT charged — it is added back inside operating cash flow.
To be worth $5.19 today, the market must believe free cash flow compounds -43.2%/yr for a decade (off $1.99B on the 3-yr avg basis).
Default is 8.5% — this company's computed cost of capital (computed WACC), the same rate the Analysis tab discounts at.
2-stage DCF · 0.71B shares (market data) · net debt -$1.45B
Today's price is outside this grid at every discount rate shown — the assumptions it requires lie beyond the plotted range, which is itself the finding.
mean 637.3% · volatility σ 1853% · implied rate exceeded in 2/6 yrs
Central path = implied -43.2%/yr growth; shaded band = ±1σ (1853%) of this company's historical FCF volatility, widening with time. The wider the band, the less certain the growth.
Reverse DCF: rather than guessing a fair value, we solve for the growth the current price implies, then you stress-test the assumptions. Enterprise value of the FCF stream, less net debt, ÷ shares. Educational — not a recommendation.
What the company returns to shareholders — and whether it's covered by cash.
No dividend to cover. Last year: $0 dividends + $0 buybacks = $0 returned on -$654.0M FCF.
Yields use the latest fiscal-year dividends/buybacks over current market cap. Dividends and buybacks from the SEC cash-flow statement; payout coverage vs net income and free cash flow. Educational — not a recommendation.
How management deployed cash over 10 years — and what it earned on reinvestment.
A reinvestment story — most cash went back into growth rather than to shareholders.
Insufficient data. Rough measure (includes maintenance capex).
Cash uses aggregated from the SEC cash-flow statement over 10 fiscal years. "Return on reinvestment" is a rough proxy — operating-income change ÷ cumulative CapEx + M&A — and includes maintenance capex. Educational — not a recommendation.
EOD close · as of 2026-10-30
How a revenue dollar becomes profit — FY2025
Dividends and buybacks are cash paid out, shown here against the same year's profit for scale — not funded from it.
Each value shows its share of revenue below it (common-size).
| Line Item | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | FY2019 | FY2018 | FY2017 | FY2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $9.66B 100.0% | $10.02B 100.0% | $10.93B 100.0% | $14.20B 100.0% | $11.34B 100.0% | $6.12B 100.0% | $8.99B 100.0% | $11.78B 100.0% | $12.62B 100.0% | $7.38B 100.0% |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $15.01B 118.9% | $13.41B 181.8% |
| Cost of Products | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $15.01B 118.9% | $13.41B 181.8% |
| Selling, General & Admin | $837.0M 8.7% | $783.0M 7.8% | $852.0M 7.8% | $1.25B 8.8% | $1.24B 10.9% | $1.19B 19.5% | $1.38B 15.3% | $1.39B 11.8% | $1.27B 10.1% | $1.00B 13.6% |
| Total Operating Expenses | $10.00B 103.6% | $10.59B 105.7% | $11.86B 108.4% | $14.19B 99.9% | $11.92B 105.1% | $8.71B 142.2% | $10.73B 119.3% | $11.55B 98.1% | $10.75B 85.2% | $9.75B 132.2% |
| Interest Expense | $504.0M 5.2% | $523.0M 5.2% | $554.0M 5.1% | $568.0M 4.0% | $666.0M 5.9% | $688.0M 11.2% | $605.0M 6.7% | $524.0M 4.4% | $655.0M 5.2% | $692.0M 9.4% |
| Other Income (Expense), net | — | — | -$69.0M -0.6% | -$177.0M -1.2% | -$84.0M -0.7% | -$31.0M -0.5% | $19.0M 0.2% | $0 0.0% | -$22.0M -0.2% | $42.0M 0.6% |
| Pretax Income | -$345.0M -3.6% | -$567.0M -5.7% | -$922.0M -8.4% | $9.0M 0.1% | -$578.0M -5.1% | -$2.58B -42.2% | -$1.74B -19.3% | $223.0M 1.9% | $1.87B 14.8% | -$2.37B -32.2% |
| Income Tax Expense | -$19.0M -0.2% | -$25.0M -0.2% | $90.0M 0.8% | $34.0M 0.2% | -$78.0M -0.7% | -$116.0M -1.9% | $20.0M 0.2% | -$14.0M -0.1% | -$532.0M -4.2% | -$88.0M -1.2% |
| Net Income | -$299.0M -3.1% | -$445.0M -4.4% | -$684.0M -6.3% | -$183.0M -1.3% | -$518.0M -4.6% | -$1.65B -27.0% | -$1.10B -12.2% | $1.48B 12.6% | $2.45B 19.4% | -$1.13B -15.3% |
Source: SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (annual, fiscal year). Quarterly flow items are derived from cumulative filings; balance-sheet figures are as-of each period end. Ratios and margins are computed, not reported.
EOD close · as of 2026-10-30
Where each multiple sits in its own 14-yr range
Dot = today · shaded = middle 50% · line = median. Lower percentile = cheaper vs its own 14-yr history.
Is the profit real, and how strong is the balance sheet?
FY2025 · every deduction from revenue to net income
DuPont — the three levers
ROIC is not available for this period, so the share of ROE attributable to leverage cannot be separated out.
What the company owes vs. what it holds
This shows debt/cash structure and net leverage. The year-by-year maturity schedule is on the Debt & Leverage tab.
Latest year: profit growth vs revenue growth
Operating leverage needs meaningful revenue change.
Each line as % of revenue — the trend in color
| % of revenue | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SG&A | 11.8 | 15.3 | 19.5 | 10.9 | 8.8 | 7.8 | 7.8 | 8.7 |
| Income Tax | -0.1 | 0.2 | -1.9 | -0.7 | 0.2 | 0.8 | -0.2 | -0.2 |
| Net Income | 12.6 | -12.2 | -27.0 | -4.6 | -1.3 | -6.3 | -4.4 | -3.1 |
Green = margin-favorable vs the row's own range · red = unfavorable.
The metrics that matter, over time
A 30-second read on IEP: price, valuation and headline fundamentals from SEC filings. The four questions at the top of the page are where the judgements live.
How much the company owes, how it's trended, and how comfortably it's serviced.
Cash of $1.45B covers the $405.0M due within a year 3.6× over. Scheduled principal only (excludes interest & revolver draws). As of 2025-12-31 (10-K).
Insufficient EBITDA/debt history.
Green ≤ 1.5× · amber ≤ 3× · red > 3× (leverage relative to cash earnings).
Interest expense isn't separately reported — often netted into “other income (expense), net.”
Cash vs short-term debt unavailable.
Short-term / long-term split not separately reported.
Debt, cash, interest and equity from the SEC balance sheet & income statement. Effective rate = interest ÷ average debt. Maturity ladder from the SEC long-term-debt repayment schedule. Educational — not a recommendation.
No positive operating income in the last three years, so there is no return on capital to compare against its cost.
| Fiscal year | Gross margin | Operating margin | Net margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2016 | -81.8% | not reported | -15.3% |
| FY2017 | -18.9% | not reported | 19.4% |
| FY2018 | not reported | not reported | 12.6% |
| FY2019 | not reported | not reported | -12.2% |
| FY2020 | not reported | not reported | -27.0% |
| FY2021 | not reported | not reported | -4.6% |
| FY2022 | not reported | not reported | -1.3% |
| FY2023 | not reported | not reported | -6.3% |
| FY2024 | not reported | not reported | -4.4% |
| FY2025 | not reported | not reported | -3.1% |
No material counter-signal in the checked set: ROIC vs WACC spread, 5-year spread history, gross margin trend, operating margin trend, net margin against 3 years ago, revenue growth, ROIC ex-goodwill gap.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: positive EBIT.
Fewer than three profitable years with a cash flow statement, so cash conversion cannot be judged.
No material counter-signal in the checked set: FCF / net income over 3 and 5 years, Sloan accruals, SBC as a share of revenue, SBC as a share of operating cash flow, SBC-adjusted free cash flow, free cash flow per diluted share, buybacks against SBC issued, capex vs depreciation, free cash flow against revenue, share count since the first year on file, cash conversion cycle (DSO, DIO, DPO), receivables growth against revenue growth.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: 3 years of cash flow.
No debt, so there is no leverage path to distress.
Ladder as of 2025-12-31 (10-K); cash from the 2025-12-31 balance sheet; FCF from FY2025. Free cash flow is negative, so projected resources fall rather than accumulate.
Balance sheet at 2025-12-31. Undrawn revolving credit is not shown: the tag is collected but not yet mapped through to the API.
Cash burn, not leverage, is the risk for a debt-free company — see question 2 for cash conversion.
At $5.19, free cash flow must compound -43.2%/yr for 10 years. It has no positive compounding record to compare against.
| Fiscal year | FCF growth | Price requires |
|---|---|---|
| FY2022 | 4381.3% | −43.2% |
| FY2023 | 378.8% | −43.2% |
| FY2024 | −83.9% | −43.2% |
| FY2025 | −218.5% | −43.2% |
The implied rate has been matched or beaten in 2 of the last 4 years.