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Data as of Q3 2026
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Total shares institutions bought (green) vs sold (red) each quarter across all holders.
Inferred from quarter-over-quarter change in each fund's 13F position (new stakes count as buys, exits as sells). Not tick-level trades.
Top 16 institutional holders — bubble size is position value, color is the move since last quarter. Hover any holder for detail.
Drag any bubble to rearrange · size = dollar value of the position
Last reported position per insider, carried forward. Steps can be a holding disclosed for the first time rather than a trade.
| Date | Insider | What it was | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-28 | Chaudhary Rajeev Kumar Director | Open-market buyindirect | 3,000 | $15.80 | $47k |
| 2026-10-26 | 4 co-filers Group filing | Open-market buyindirect | 50,000 | $15.32 | $766k |
| 2026-10-23 | Boer Carrie L Director | Open-market buy | 12,000 | $15.40 | $185k |
| 2026-10-23 |
Every row is classified by what it MEANT, not by its SEC code. A code is not a meaning: code P (“purchase”) also covers dividend reinvestment and employee stock purchase plans, and code S (“sale”) also covers 10b5-1 plan sales scheduled months earlier and option exercises sold the same day.
Across 30 days of all filings, $5.08bn of insider selling contained $3.50bn of plan sales and $0.46bn of exercise-and-sell. Only 29% was discretionary. Reading an unclassified feed badly overstates how much insiders decided.
Buys and sales are counted separately and never netted. They are different decisions by different people; a company where one officer bought while another sold is not “neutral”.
The holding line carries each insider's last reported position forward, so it shows the total held rather than a sawtooth of whoever traded that day. It covers only insiders who filed in the window.
“Filed late” counts calendar days past the two-business-day deadline with five days' grace, so a Thursday or Friday trade crossing a weekend is never flagged. It describes the company's filing discipline, not the trade.
Insider activity is descriptive. Nothing here is investment advice.
Long Joseph B Chief Operating Officer |
| Open-market buy |
| 3,240 |
| $15.37 |
| $50k |
| 2026-10-23 | 4 co-filers Group filing | Open-market buyindirect | 50,000 | $15.42 | $771k |
| 2026-09-01 | 2 co-filers Group filing | Open-market buyindirect | 85,000 | $16.74 | $1.4m |
| 2026-08-26 | 4 co-filers Group filing | Open-market buyindirect | 48,312 | $16.95 | $819k |
| 2026-08-25 | 4 co-filers Group filing | Open-market buyindirect | 30,000 | $16.95 | $508k |
| 2026-08-14 | 2 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 720 | $17.50 | $13k |
| 2026-08-14 | 2 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 52 | $17.51 | $910 |
| 2026-08-13 | 2 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 339 | $17.53 | $6k |
| 2026-08-13 | 2 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 24 | $17.53 | $421 |
| 2026-08-04 | 4 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 2,946 | $17.57 | $52k |
| 2026-08-04 | 4 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 210 | $17.57 | $4k |
| 2026-08-03 | 4 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 2,995 | $17.59 | $53k |
| 2026-08-03 | 4 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 214 | $17.59 | $4k |
| 2026-07-01 | 2 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 7,000 | $19.30 | $135k |
| 2026-07-01 | 2 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 500 | $19.30 | $10k |
| 2026-06-09 | 6 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 2,194 | $17.70 | $39k |
| 2026-06-09 | 6 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 157 | $17.70 | $3k |
| 2026-06-08 | 6 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 722 | $17.52 | $13k |
| 2026-06-08 | 6 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 17 | $17.53 | $298 |
| 2026-06-05 | 6 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect2d late | 234 | $17.52 | $4k |
| 2026-06-05 | 6 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect2d late | 51 | $17.52 | $894 |
| 2026-06-02 | 2 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 3,850 | $17.50 | $67k |
| 2026-06-02 | 2 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 275 | $17.51 | $5k |
| 2026-05-13 | Hood Rodney E. Director | Grant31d late | 2,606 | $0.00 | — |
| 2026-05-13 | Lawrence David F. Director | Grant31d late | 2,606 | $0.00 | — |
| 2026-05-13 | Tuttle John Robert Director | Grant31d late | 2,606 | $0.00 | — |
| 2026-05-13 | Chaudhary Rajeev Kumar Director | Grant31d late | 2,606 | $0.00 | — |
| 2026-05-13 | Hooker David Stevens Director | Grant31d late | 2,606 | $0.00 | — |
| 2026-05-13 | Boer Carrie L Director | Grant31d late | 2,606 | $0.00 | — |
| 2026-05-13 | De Vlieger Robert W Ii Director | Grant31d late | 2,606 | $0.00 | — |
| 2026-05-13 | 2 co-filers Group filing | Open-market buyindirect | 25,000 | $17.08 | $427k |
| 2026-05-12 | 2 co-filers Group filing | Open-market buyindirect | 25,000 | $17.21 | $430k |
| 2026-05-01 | 2 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 7,000 | $17.82 | $125k |
| 2026-05-01 | 2 co-filers Group filing | 10b5-1 plan saleindirect | 500 | $17.82 | $9k |
| 2026-04-01 | 3 co-filers PRES, MORTGAGE PURCH PROGRAM | Option exercise | 9,333 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | 2 co-filers Group filing | Grant60d late | 28,000 | $0.00 | — |
| 2026-04-01 | Howes Brad T EVP, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER | Grant60d late | 21,000 | $0.00 | — |
A reverse discounted cash flow is not shown for a bank.
Funded by deposits, so debt-weighted leverage and a WACC are not defined. Capital adequacy (CET1, LCR) is the right question and is not collected yet.
Classified from the filings: SIC code.
What the company returns to shareholders — and whether it's covered by cash.
The dividend is comfortably covered — only 8% of free cash flow, leaving room to grow it and fund buybacks. Last year: $3.2M dividends + $0 buybacks = $3.2M returned on $41.5M FCF.
Yields use the latest fiscal-year dividends/buybacks over current market cap. Dividends and buybacks from the SEC cash-flow statement; payout coverage vs net income and free cash flow. Educational — not a recommendation.
How management deployed cash over 3 years — and what it earned on reinvestment.
A balanced mix of reinvestment and shareholder returns.
Insufficient data. Current ROIC on all capital: 15%. Rough measure (includes maintenance capex).
Cash uses aggregated from the SEC cash-flow statement over 3 fiscal years. "Return on reinvestment" is a rough proxy — operating-income change ÷ cumulative CapEx + M&A — and includes maintenance capex. Educational — not a recommendation.
EOD close · as of 2026-10-30
Is the profit real, and how strong is the balance sheet?
FY2025 · every deduction from revenue to net income
DuPont — the three levers
ROE 15% against ROIC 15% — 0% of the return on equity comes from leverage and buybacks rather than from the operating business.
Equity is the year-end figure. On average equity over the two year-ends, ROE is 16.2% — the two diverge when buybacks or issuance move equity during the year.
What the company owes vs. what it holds
This shows debt/cash structure and net leverage. The year-by-year maturity schedule is on the Debt & Leverage tab.
Latest year: profit growth vs revenue growth
Operating leverage needs meaningful revenue change.
Each line as % of revenue — the trend in color
| % of revenue | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|
Green = margin-favorable vs the row's own range · red = unfavorable.
The metrics that matter, over time
A 30-second read on NPB: price, valuation and headline fundamentals from SEC filings. The four questions at the top of the page are where the judgements live.
Leverage ratios is not shown for a bank.
Funded by deposits, so debt-weighted leverage and a WACC are not defined. Capital adequacy (CET1, LCR) is the right question and is not collected yet.
Classified from the filings: SIC code.
How much the company owes, how it's trended, and how comfortably it's serviced.
Interest expense isn't separately reported — often netted into “other income (expense), net.”
Cash vs short-term debt unavailable.
Short-term / long-term split not separately reported.
Debt, cash, interest and equity from the SEC balance sheet & income statement. Effective rate = interest ÷ average debt. Educational — not a recommendation.
EOD close · as of 2026-10-30
How a revenue dollar becomes profit — FY2025
Each value shows its share of revenue below it (common-size).
| Line Item | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Interest & Investment Income | — | $31.4M | $29.1M |
| Pretax Income | $110.4M | $72.9M | $44.7M |
| Income Tax Expense | $27.0M | $17.7M | $10.9M |
| Net Income | $83.4M | $55.2M | $33.8M |
| Per Share | |||
| EPS (Basic) | $2.14 | $1.83 | $0.94 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.11 | $1.83 | $0.93 |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Basic) | 33.4M | 25.8M | 25.7M |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Diluted) | 33.9M | 25.8M | 25.8M |
Source: SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (annual, fiscal year). Quarterly flow items are derived from cumulative filings; balance-sheet figures are as-of each period end. Ratios and margins are computed, not reported.
Ranked against 19 sector peers with collected financials. Valuation from latest close × latest fiscal-year fundamentals; 13F conviction as of 2026-09-30.
Percentile is “goodness” within the peer set (100 = best). For valuation and leverage that means cheaper / less-levered ranks higher.
| Company | Mkt cap ▼ | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/S | Rev gr | Gross | Net | ROE | ROIC | Net D/EBITDA | 13F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| STT | $46.2B | 18.1× | — | 3.3× | 7.3% | — | 21.1% | 10.6% | 10.6% | — | 388 |
| NTRS | $30.9B | 19.4× | — | 3.8× | -2.5% | — | 21.5% | 13.4% | 13.4% | — | 272 |
| CFG | $26.7B | 16.5× | — | 3.2× | 5.6% | — | 22.2% | 7.0% | 4.9% | — | 319 |
| FCNCA | $26.1B | 14.2× | — | 2.7× | -2.2% | — | 23.1% | 9.9% | 3.8% | — | 162 |
| ALLY | $11.6B | 16.1× | — | 1.5× | -3.3% | — | 10.8% | 5.5% | 2.5% | — | 140 |
| UCB | $4.4B | 14.0× | — | 4.1× | 11.7% | — | 30.9% | 9.0% | 8.5% | — | 84 |
| FBP | $4.0B | 12.2× | — | 3.1× | 2.4% | — | 27.5% | 17.5% | 15.3% | — | 67 |
| FHB | $3.1B | 11.4× | — | 3.5× | 8.9% | — | 31.4% | 10.0% | 10.0% | — | 74 |
| BUSE | $2.4B | 19.6× | — | 3.3× | 55.7% | — | 18.8% | 5.5% | 5.5% | — | 61 |
| GABC | $1.8B | 16.0× | — | 3.8× | 37.8% | — | 23.1% | 9.7% | 8.9% | — | 39 |
| PEBO | $1.4B | 12.9× | 12.8× | 16.0× | 2.3% | — | — | 8.8% | 5.8% | 3.1× | 41 |
| UVSP | $1.1B | 12.7× | — | 3.3× | 9.6% | — | 27.7% | 9.6% | 9.4% | — | 49 |
| FMNB | $927M | 10.8× | — | 3.3× | 3.9% | — | 19.5% | 11.2% | 6.4% | — | 33 |
| WASH | $736M | 14.2× | — | 3.2× | 128% | — | 22.8% | 9.6% | 9.6% | — | 39 |
| ACNB | $665M | 18.2× | — | 3.5× | 45.1% | — | 19.3% | 8.8% | 5.0% | — | 22 |
| NPB | $546M | 7.5× | — | — | — | — | — | 14.7% | 14.7% | — | 12 |
| COFS | $530M | 17.6× | — | 2.3× | 63.6% | — | 12.4% | 6.1% | 6.1% | — | 23 |
| CFFI | $357M | 13.2× | — | 2.5× | 10.6% | — | 19.1% | 10.3% | 9.5% | — | 11 |
| MYFW | $303M | 23.1× | — | 3.1× | 7.6% | — | 13.6% | 5.0% | 5.0% | — | 17 |
| MNSB | $152M | 12.1× | — | 1.1× | -1.6% | 54.3% | 11.5% | 7.1% | 7.1% | — | 16 |
Peers = companies sharing NPB's sector (State Commercial Banks) with collected SEC financials. Multiples use the most recent end-of-day close and latest fiscal-year fundamentals (trailing, not forward). Missing cells mean the peer never reported that line item, has no collected price, or has a non-positive denominator. Not investment advice.
No positive operating income in the last three years, so there is no return on capital to compare against its cost.
Return on equity (15%) and return on invested capital (15%) are within a couple of points in FY2025, so the headline return is the operating return — there is no meaningful leverage effect to strip out.
No material counter-signal in the checked set: ROIC vs WACC spread, 5-year spread history, gross margin trend, operating margin trend, net margin against 3 years ago, revenue growth, ROIC ex-goodwill gap.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: positive EBIT.
Converts 5.23x of reported profit into cash — adequate, without much margin.
| Step | Amount | Running total |
|---|---|---|
| Net income | $83M | $83M |
| Share-based comp | not reported | not reported |
| Other non-cash & working capital | −$39M | $44M |
| Operating cash flow | $44M | $44M |
| Capex | −$3M | $42M |
| Free cash flow | $42M | $42M |
| Fiscal year | Accruals / assets |
|---|---|
| FY2023 | -9.9 percent |
| FY2024 | 0.7 percent |
| FY2025 | 0.6 percent |
Below the line, the asset base is being consumed faster than it is replaced.
Depreciation here includes amortisation of acquired intangibles — goodwill written down over time, customer lists, acquired technology. Capex does not replace those and is not meant to, so an acquisitive or asset-light company sits below 1.0 permanently and correctly. The signal is cleanest for capital-intensive businesses, where the two measure the same physical base. For that reason this informs the earnings-quality verdict but never caps it.
Shares outstanding are up 34% since FY2023 — per-share cash flow has grown more slowly than the totals above, and the gap is the owners'.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: share_based_compensation.
Leverage is not measurable this way for a bank.
Balance sheet at 2025-12-31. Undrawn revolving credit is not shown: the tag is collected but not yet mapped through to the API.
Funded by deposits, so debt-weighted leverage and a WACC are not defined. Capital adequacy (CET1, LCR) is the right question and is not collected yet.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: capital adequacy metrics for this archetype.
No growth rate within the range this model can express reaches the current price, so the requirement cannot be stated as a number.
No material counter-signal in the checked set: reverse-DCF implied growth, historical FCF CAGR, per-year FCF growth distribution, reporting-basis breaks, discount rate used, free-cash-flow basis (stock comp charged?).
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: implied_growth.