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Insufficient data to determine institutional momentum.
Data as of Q3 2026
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Total shares institutions bought (green) vs sold (red) each quarter across all holders.
Inferred from quarter-over-quarter change in each fund's 13F position (new stakes count as buys, exits as sells). Not tick-level trades.
Top 3 institutional holders — bubble size is position value, color is the move since last quarter. Hover any holder for detail.
Drag any bubble to rearrange · size = dollar value of the position
No trend data available for this metric.
Ranked against 21 sector peers with collected financials. Valuation from latest close × latest fiscal-year fundamentals; 13F conviction as of 2026-09-30.
Percentile is “goodness” within the peer set (100 = best). For valuation and leverage that means cheaper / less-levered ranks higher.
| Company | Mkt cap ▼ | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/S | Rev gr | Gross | Net | ROE | ROIC | Net D/EBITDA | 13F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| JBGS | $696M | — | 3.3× | 1.4× | -8.9% | — | -27.9% | -12.0% | -12.0% | -0.4× | 39 |
| CLDT | $687M | 105.4× | 9.9× | 2.3× | -7.0% | — | 5.1% | 2.0% | 1.4% | 3.1× | 32 |
| PSTL | $653M | 45.9× | 17.4× | 6.8× | 25.5% | — | 14.8% | 5.0% | 2.2% | 6.2× | 36 |
| UHT | $532M | 30.1× | 14.1× | 5.4× | 0.2% | — | 17.8% | 11.6% | 3.3% | 5.8× | 39 |
| BDN | $513M | — | — | 1.1× | -4.2% | 61.8% | -36.8% | -22.5% | -5.3% | — | 37 |
| NXRT | $461M | — | 16.5× | 1.8× | -3.2% | — | -12.7% | -10.8% | -1.7% | 12.8× | 36 |
| FBRT | $455M | 9.4× | — | 1.7× | 20.9% | — | 30.5% | 5.7% | 5.7% | — | 36 |
| FVR | $453M | — | 27.4× | 6.8× | 39.1% | — | -5.7% | -1.0% | -0.5% | 10.9× | 20 |
| TCI | $438M | 31.2× | 100.9× | 8.9× | 4.2% | — | 28.1% | 1.6% | 1.3% | — | 8 |
| CHCT | $374M | 163.3× | — | 3.1× | 4.7% | — | 4.2% | 1.2% | 0.5% | — | 26 |
| FPI | $368M | 13.8× | 56.3× | 7.0× | -10.4% | — | 60.5% | 6.7% | 5.0% | 17.2× | 41 |
| LAND | $320M | — | — | 3.6× | 3.7% | 89.1% | 15.3% | 2.0% | 1.2% | — | 41 |
| ARI | $300M | 2.9× | — | 1.1× | -10.6% | — | 46.7% | 6.8% | 6.8% | — | 30 |
| PINE | $294M | — | 18.9× | 4.9× | 15.9% | 86.0% | -4.4% | -0.9% | -0.4% | 11.7× | 26 |
| NLCP | $282M | 10.7× | 6.0× | 5.5× | 1.9% | — | 51.5% | 6.8% | 6.8% | -0.6× | — |
| BRT | $244M | — | 15.7× | 2.5× | 1.5% | 99.8% | -12.3% | -6.7% | -6.7% | -1.8× | 27 |
| NXDT | $210M | — | 12.4× | 2.5× | 3.3% | — | -151% | -18.6% | -18.6% | -0.5× | 22 |
| ACR | $202M | 429.7× | — | 2.5× | -4.2% | — | 35.0% | 6.6% | 1.4% | — | 12 |
| STRW | $180M | 21.1× | 7.8× | 1.2× | 32.4% | — | 4.9% | 62.6% | 0.9% | 6.3× | 14 |
| SEVN | $150M | 6.5× | — | 5.1× | -16.7% | — | 52.5% | 4.7% | 4.7% | — | 14 |
| FREVS | $141M | 40.2× | 13.5× | 4.8× | 2.2% | — | 12.0% | 10.3% | 2.3% | 5.7× | — |
| RPT | $85M | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.5% | 0.5% | — | 2 |
Peers = companies sharing RPT's sector (Real Estate Investment Trusts) with collected SEC financials. Multiples use the most recent end-of-day close and latest fiscal-year fundamentals (trailing, not forward). Missing cells mean the peer never reported that line item, has no collected price, or has a non-positive denominator. Not investment advice.
What the company returns to shareholders — and whether it's covered by cash.
No dividend to cover. Last year: $0 dividends + $0 buybacks = $0 returned on -$8.3M FCF.
Yields use the latest fiscal-year dividends/buybacks over current market cap. Dividends and buybacks from the SEC cash-flow statement; payout coverage vs net income and free cash flow. Educational — not a recommendation.
How management deployed cash over 10 years — and what it earned on reinvestment.
A cash-return story — far more went to shareholders than back into the business (mature, low-reinvestment).
Reinvestment has been productive — operating income grew well per dollar put in. Current ROIC on all capital: 1%. Rough measure (includes maintenance capex).
Cash uses aggregated from the SEC cash-flow statement over 10 fiscal years. "Return on reinvestment" is a rough proxy — operating-income change ÷ cumulative CapEx + M&A — and includes maintenance capex. Educational — not a recommendation.
Leverage ratios is not shown for a REIT.
Depreciation swamps reported earnings for a property owner — which is why FFO exists. EBITDA leverage and a net-income DCF both mislead here.
Classified from the filings: SIC code.
How much the company owes, how it's trended, and how comfortably it's serviced.
Cash of $79.3M (at 2025-12-31) covers the $0 due within a year 79321000.0× over. Scheduled principal only (excludes interest & revolver draws). As of 2024-09-30 (10-Q). The cash figure is from 2025-12-31, so the two are not the same balance-sheet date — the schedule has not been refiled since.
Interest expense isn't separately reported — often netted into “other income (expense), net.” Interest last disclosed in FY2023 (no longer broken out).
Cash vs short-term debt unavailable.
Short-term / long-term split not separately reported.
Debt, cash, interest and equity from the SEC balance sheet & income statement. Effective rate = interest ÷ average debt. Maturity ladder from the SEC long-term-debt repayment schedule. Educational — not a recommendation.
EOD close · as of 2026-10-30
How a revenue dollar becomes profit — FY2025
Each value shows its share of revenue below it (common-size).
| Line Item | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | FY2019 | FY2018 | FY2017 | FY2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Selling, General & Admin | $4.2M | $9.0M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Operating Expenses | $16.0M | $39.9M | $29.7M | $35.4M | $34.4M | $29.4M | $27.3M | $3.3M | $2.6M | $2.6M |
| Interest Expense | — | — | $59.3M | $43.6M | $36.7M | $48.7M | $59.3M | $53.3M | $39.1M | $25.6M |
| Interest & Investment Income | — | — | — | — | $79.9M | $86.1M | $97.1M | $102.5M | $89.9M | $70.6M |
| Other Income (Expense), net | $2.1M | -$62.3M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Pretax Income | $1.5M | -$92.9M | -$46.7M | -$12.1M | $42.1M | $33.6M | $37.2M | $31.4M | $30.3M | $28.9M |
| Income Tax Expense | $60K | $145K | $243K | $2.8M | $293K | -$39K | $124K | $64K | $131K | $35K |
| Net Income | -$2.7M | -$92.2M | -$49.3M | -$15.0M | $41.9M | $28.5M | $34.7M | $28.3M | $28.9M | $27.8M |
| Per Share | ||||||||||
| EPS (Basic) | -$0.36 | -$13.76 | -$2.01 | -$1.24 | $1.48 | $1.00 | $1.74 | $1.50 | $1.58 | $1.65 |
| EPS (Diluted) | -$0.36 | -$13.76 | -$2.01 | -$1.24 | $1.41 | $1.00 | $1.59 | $1.43 | $1.51 | $1.65 |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Basic) | 7.6M | 6.7M | 24.3M | 22.7M | 22.9M | 22.6M | 19.7M | 18.6M | 18.1M | 16.7M |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Diluted) | 7.6M | 6.7M | 24.3M | 23.0M | 30.3M | 22.6M | 28.2M | 25.8M | 23.3M | 17.5M |
Source: SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (annual, fiscal year). Quarterly flow items are derived from cumulative filings; balance-sheet figures are as-of each period end. Ratios and margins are computed, not reported.
A reverse discounted cash flow is not shown for a REIT.
Depreciation swamps reported earnings for a property owner — which is why FFO exists. EBITDA leverage and a net-income DCF both mislead here.
Classified from the filings: SIC code.
Last reported position per insider, carried forward. Steps can be a holding disclosed for the first time rather than a trade.
| Date | Insider | What it was | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-05 | Rithm Capital Corp. 10% owner | Otherindirect | 137,383 | $11.73 | $1.6m |
| 2026-04-27 | Rithm Capital Corp. 10% owner | Otherindirect | 110,794 | $14.50 | $1.6m |
| 2026-02-12 | Rithm Capital Corp. 10% owner | Otherindirect | 105,687 | $15.17 | $1.6m |
Every row is classified by what it MEANT, not by its SEC code. A code is not a meaning: code P (“purchase”) also covers dividend reinvestment and employee stock purchase plans, and code S (“sale”) also covers 10b5-1 plan sales scheduled months earlier and option exercises sold the same day.
Across 30 days of all filings, $5.08bn of insider selling contained $3.50bn of plan sales and $0.46bn of exercise-and-sell. Only 29% was discretionary. Reading an unclassified feed badly overstates how much insiders decided.
Buys and sales are counted separately and never netted. They are different decisions by different people; a company where one officer bought while another sold is not “neutral”.
The holding line carries each insider's last reported position forward, so it shows the total held rather than a sawtooth of whoever traded that day. It covers only insiders who filed in the window.
“Filed late” counts calendar days past the two-business-day deadline with five days' grace, so a Thursday or Friday trade crossing a weekend is never flagged. It describes the company's filing discipline, not the trade.
Insider activity is descriptive. Nothing here is investment advice.
Total return (dividends reinvested) vs the market, from quarter-end prices.
Above 0 = ahead of the S&P 500 since the window start; below 0 = behind. Rising means it's pulling ahead.
How far the stock fell below its prior peak. Deeper, longer drawdowns = a rougher ride to the same return.
Quarter-end, dividend-adjusted (total return). Beta & volatility from quarterly returns (annualized). Benchmark is the S&P 500 (SPY total return). Annual returns compound the quarters ending in each calendar year; the first and last years in a window may be partial. Past performance doesn't predict future results.
EOD close · as of 2026-10-30
Where each multiple sits in its own 12-yr range · 56th pct blended
Dot = today · shaded = middle 50% · line = median. Lower percentile = cheaper vs its own 12-yr history.
Is the profit real, and how strong is the balance sheet?
FY2025 · every deduction from revenue to net income
DuPont — the three levers
ROE 1% against ROIC 1% — 0% of the return on equity comes from leverage and buybacks rather than from the operating business.
What the company owes vs. what it holds
This shows debt/cash structure and net leverage. The year-by-year maturity schedule is on the Debt & Leverage tab.
Latest year: profit growth vs revenue growth
Operating leverage needs meaningful revenue change.
Each line as % of revenue — the trend in color
| % of revenue | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|
Green = margin-favorable vs the row's own range · red = unfavorable.
The metrics that matter, over time
A 30-second read on RPT: price, valuation and headline fundamentals from SEC filings. The four questions at the top of the page are where the judgements live.
No positive operating income in the last three years, so there is no return on capital to compare against its cost.
Return on equity (1%) and return on invested capital (1%) are within a couple of points in FY2025, so the headline return is the operating return — there is no meaningful leverage effect to strip out.
No material counter-signal in the checked set: ROIC vs WACC spread, 5-year spread history, gross margin trend, operating margin trend, net margin against 3 years ago, revenue growth, ROIC ex-goodwill gap.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: positive EBIT.
Free cash flow has fallen short of reported profit in 3 of the last three years.
Only 4 profitable years available, so the average is shorter than the five the threshold assumes.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: share_based_compensation.
Leverage is not measurable this way for a reit.
This schedule comes from a filing dated 2024-09-30, 761 days old. Maturities are shown relative to that date, not to today.
Ladder as of 2024-09-30 (10-Q); cash from the 2025-12-31 balance sheet; FCF from FY2025. Free cash flow is negative, so projected resources fall rather than accumulate.
Balance sheet at 2025-12-31. Undrawn revolving credit is not shown: the tag is collected but not yet mapped through to the API.
Depreciation swamps reported earnings for a property owner — which is why FFO exists. EBITDA leverage and a net-income DCF both mislead here.
Missing from our data, so excluded from this answer: capital adequacy metrics for this archetype.
At $10.72, free cash flow must compound 6.92%/yr for 10 years. It has no positive compounding record to compare against.
| Fiscal year | FCF growth | Price requires |
|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | −4293.5% | 6.9% |
| FY2025 | −2963.8% | 6.9% |
The percentile ranks the FISCAL-YEAR point, because the distribution behind each strip is built from fiscal-year closes — ranking a TTM figure inside it would compare two different bases. TTM basis: TTM.
The cost of capital could not be computed for this company, so the requirement is solved at the published 10% default — a different rate would move it materially.
| Step | Amount | Running total |
|---|---|---|
| Net income | $1M | $1M |
| Share-based comp | not reported | not reported |
| Other non-cash & working capital | −$10M | −$8M |
| Operating cash flow | −$8M | −$8M |
| Capex | $0 | −$8M |
| Free cash flow | −$8M | −$8M |
| Fiscal year | Accruals / assets |
|---|---|
| FY2019 | 3.1 percent |
| FY2020 | 2.6 percent |
| FY2021 | 3.4 percent |
| FY2022 | -1.1 percent |
| FY2023 | -0.1 percent |
| FY2024 | -9.4 percent |
| FY2025 | 0.9 percent |
Below the line, the asset base is being consumed faster than it is replaced.
Depreciation here includes amortisation of acquired intangibles — goodwill written down over time, customer lists, acquired technology. Capex does not replace those and is not meant to, so an acquisitive or asset-light company sits below 1.0 permanently and correctly. The signal is cleanest for capital-intensive businesses, where the two measure the same physical base. For that reason this informs the earnings-quality verdict but never caps it.